Transnistria to no longer receive Russian gas by 2025

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux Just to be clear - I am not ignoring you! But I was away for a few days.. will get back with a reply where I will also touch upon the recent news that Ukraine send its military at a Romanian monastery in Chernivtsi. 

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux So in recent days the Ukrainian security forces encircles the Bănceni Monastery near the border with Romania, in the ethnically Romanian part of western Ukraine. Bănceni Monastery is actually pretty famous in Romania proper and before the war (and even after) many Romanians went to the monastery there. The monastery has an orphanage with 400 children and kept thousands of refugees & gave a lot of help the the ones fleeing the conflict (Ukrainains and non-Ukrainians alike), but it's politically inconvenient because it doesn't belong to the Ukrainian Church promoted by Zelensky. Because of this and perhaps because they are Romanian-speaking, the Ukrainian Army is very circumspect of them, including stripped naked the main monk in the past to search him. The situation is getting ugly because the Romanian community in Ukraine is discontent and the public opinion in Romania is about to get very inflamed for how native Romanians are treated. 

How they don't see that this has the potential to turn into a larger diplomatic conflict it's beyond me, but they might not care and for good reason, ''Slava Ukraini'' and American support for Ukraine's narrative cancells any possibility of criticism - I don't need to say it outright because it's a given. 

On Turkey's ambitions in Romania - I don't think Turkey has any claim (informally or not) on Romanian lands, because the Romanian Principalities were never intregated fully into the Ottoman Empire like Serbia and Bulgaria (first of all), second of all because there are very few Turkish people living in Romania, unlike Bulgaria where there are a significant % of the population. Nowadays Romania and Turkey have good relations and even collaborate militarily as 2 countries of NATO's eastern flank. Even recently when Ergodan complained about the los of past territories, he mentioned cities in North Macedonia, Syria, Greece, Palestine etc, but nothing about Romania, so there's that at least  On the other hand, his ambitions regarding the Greek islands and especially Kastellorizo are well-know.

About the Ukrainian refugees in the Republic of Moldova - the dynamic was that Ukrainians were reluctant to come to Romania proper because they believed Romania is a dirty and emporished country made of ''gypsies'' (instead, the Ukrainians who came found a developed country - more developed than Ukraine, so it was a cultural shock. Nevertheless many Ukrainians came to Romania proper - but in smaller numbers than in the Republic which now has a big refugee population. On one hand, this is great because local Moldovan Ukrainians tend to be pro-Russia, so more Ukrainians who are anti-Russia will cancel out the pro-Russian tendencies which destablize Moldova. There are a record numbers of Ukrainian children learning at schools in Moldova https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/numar-dublu-de-refugiati-ucraineni-in-institutiile-de-invatamant-din-r-moldova/32592617.html (2k) - and they do appear to learn Romanian, so there are good prospects about their integration.

Kuban was actually majority Ukrainian in the past, so Ukraine asking for it is not really surprising- Ukrainians and Russians settled at the same time there, and took roots on the lands left open by the Circassian Genocide (Russians and Ukrainians also settled simultaneously in the lands of southern Ukraine as well, when the Russian Empire kicked out the Ottomans from the region). There is actually even one Romanian majority village in Krasnodar founded by Russian Empire to exploit the agricultural lands (ofc assimilated by Russia by now).

Lastly, regarding NATO in Romania: I believe if the war spreads to Romania, and the allied armies including the Unites States' don't move to Romania to defend it outright (not by using slogans overseas, but with their effective armies), then NATO will be proven to be a null organization. By that point hypotetically we should just switch to Russia if Russia cares enough about us to send troops in our territory while the US doesn't.  Defending Romania for an invasion would the be and end all of the meaningulness of NATO. But for this reason I have trust that the Unites States' can't afford to not do anything if Romania's security in jeopardy, because they would effectielly lose all of NATO: NATO would be proven to be a lie. Likewise this is the reason why Russia won't do anything (Russia is scared of NATO and never wants to antagonize it directly). Because of these reasons I also don't want Romania to be militarized and/or to reinforced conscription, as I won't abide by it - these should be wars of the military elites & I myself am nobody's meat grinder. 

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

8 hours ago, FfFfFfFF said:

The monastery is politically inconvenient because it doesn't belong to the Ukrainian Church promoted by Zelensky, ''Slava Ukraini'' and American support for Ukraine's narrative cancells any possibility of criticism

Even recently when Ergodan complained about the loss of past territories, he mentioned cities in North Macedonia, Syria, Greece, Palestine etc, but nothing about Romania, so there's that at least  On the other hand, his ambitions regarding the Greek islands and especially Kastellorizo are well-known.

I read about Ukraine restructuring its church structures. I am of the opinion that the church's proclamation of truth should not be tied to nationality or political guidelines, but rather to religious beliefs, which should not actually depend on who rules where. The fact that the Russian Orthodox Church has created a mood for a Greater Russia has of course angered Ukraine and it was foreseeable that Ukraine would counter-react. But does Ukraine also have to punish the other neighboring countries to the west for this? Ukraine must also learn to distinguish "enemy" from "institution with different opinion". Churches must have internal autonomy, just like universities. If they are directed or monitored by the state gov just because they deviate from the prevailing "mandatory state opinion", then that is not a completely free state, doesn't meet the criteria to join EU. I think Ukraine is tyrannizing this monastery because it doesn't fit into Ukraine's new nationalist self-image. Ukraine actually wanted to join the EU very quickly; but what it does actually only slows the process down even further. Poland has made hints that it might tie Ukraines EU membership to recognizing the massacre in Volhynia as a massacre. Hungary may impose some demands, too. It isn't wise to frustrate Romania now about it, b/c RO could add demands, too.

I absolutely agree with you that Greece has the greatest risk of being invaded by Turkey (after Syria). The small islands on the coast are very vulnerable. It would even be possible that if Turkey takes over the islands and Greece defends itself, they would then see this as a declaration of war and, as punishment, take even some of the mainland away from Greece and move the border to the west. In Turkey, people are of the opinion that Greece is not allowed to militarize the near islands according to an older treaty. I don't know much about the treaty and therefore don't judge it, but I just note that in Turkey they basically have a legal excuse to invade them, even if it is not considered legal by other, in the end  what counts for Erdogan is only what his compatriots consider legal and that the invaded country has no nucleaer weapons.

Do you think Erdogan admires Putin and maybe even is jealous?

Because Putin doesn't just think wishfully and wallows in nostalgia, he actually shifts borders,  although Turkey actually did that in Northern Cyprus before modern Russia and is actually doing that in Syria, too, the so-called security zones are indirectly Turkish influence zones. You also have to keep in mind that Turkey would have an easier time with Greece, because it is a NATO member and NATO protection is not designed for when two NATO states are at war. I can well imagine that, considering that there are many Turkish migrants in Western, Northern and Central Europe, the governments of these countries would actually not be that keen to help Greece. Because Erdogan can mobilize his compatriots beyond his borders and who wants stress with Erdogan's millions of fans? In this way, Erdogan could successfully blackmail Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France, and therefore the enitre EU. The Turkish compatriots in Western Europe would then refer to the allegedly broken treaty and then lobby for their opinion and there will certainly be at least some parts of non-Turks that agree with them and would be against supporting Greece. I think maybe Erdogan uses the time now to militarize his country. And then he just waits until the Taiwan War comes to grab the islets (because the US will be distracted in the Taiwan War). In the very worst case scenario, Turkey and Russia could join forces and divide the Black Sea between themselves, dividing Romania in half. I agree with you, that Romania is not the first goal, neither a second goal and perhaps no goal at all.

Why do I come to this opinion? A big mistake I make when I judge Turkey is that I think the opposition parties behave similarly to those in the West. And the western media acts as if and it's not right. Maybe you remember Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the presidential candidate? He was praised by the Western press as westernizing and modern and liberal. And I believed that because I knew little else about Turkey and it seemed so obvious. But then came a statement that changed everything. Do you know what KK said about Greece? Erdogan said he wanted or could "suddenly come to Greece overnight," alluding to a surprise invasion. KK replied: "The risks of conflict, however, do not appear to fully deter Erdogan or his electoral opponents. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, head of Turkey’s largest opposition party, lambasted Erdogan’s pledge to “come suddenly one night.” A real leader, he argued, would replicate Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus and simply seize Greece's “occupied” islands without threats or warnings. A spokesman from the nationalist IYI Party echoed these sentiments. Erdogan, he maintained, had demonstrated his inability to lead by not making Greece “pay a cost” for dispatching armored vehicles to Samos and Lesvos."

https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/why-erdogan-might-choose-war-with-greece/

KK accused Erdogan of giving Greece an unfair tip and helping it to protect itself from an invasion because it was supposedly forewarned by his warning. KK wanted to take it without warning. I am honestly shocked that such words come from an opposition party. I would have thought there would be voices there for peace or avoiding war. But they are all very nationalistic there and that is bad for Greece. Turks had the choice between voting for a surprise, surprise invasion of Greece or a pre-announced surprise invasion  It won't be good for the economic development of Romania if the greater region is de-stabilized to such a big extent.

 

I'm optimistic that the UKR migrants in MOL will integrate, at least the new generation, the kids will fastly. By the way, the elections in Moldova topic has 0 replies (1 if we count my reply in this topic to it), I think this shows how unkown, foreign, not relevant enough Moldova is to the general world. It is neutral and doesn't 'cause any strong emotions somehow.   People don't really know much about Moldova, it's no-man's-land. Moldova could try to become an international conference country like Switzerland, Singapore and previously Finnland was. Now that Finland joined NATO, it isn't considered neutral anymore. A new space has become empty to be filled by another country. Moldova could take this position. It could host talks between the West and Russia, China, etc. countries that are in conflict together.

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux

The situation of the Orthodox Church is very not good in Ukraine from a human rights's perspective. For starters, the Orthodox Church operates differently than the Catholic Church which many are more familiar with in the West: even though there are commonalities, the Orthodox Church's hierarchy gives way more power to individual dioceses and their bishops, which are often organized in or around a single country (although not always, for instance Jerusalem and Antioch are the 2 churches which operate in the Middle East and split the region in half, while in Eastern Europe the Republic of Moldova doesn't have an independent church of its own) - the Orthodox don't have a Pope. This allows room from disagreements and disputes, but there are canons and common professions of the faith which after all tie all individual churches together. In Ukraine there are 2 Orthodox Churches: one that is in good standing with the canons, and which declared its independence from the Russian Church to which it belonged since a canonical transfer of territory from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinopole to the Patriarchate of Moscow, and one which is in bad standing with church canons but is supported by Zelensky. Mind you - both of them are mainly made of ethnic Ukrainians and neither are no longer part of the greater Russian Church, but that doesn't stop the government from persecuting the Church lead by Metropolitan Onufriy (who condemned the war on day 1). A scarry facet of this is that these persecuted people (which are, again, Ukrainians, not Russians) are ready to die as martyrs, and Zelensky now appears as force of evil that wants to destroy Orthodoxy. The church crackdown does so much harm to the Ukrainian society and nobody in the political elites understand this: only Arestovich said something that the government should let the Orthodox just be and he had to resign eventually for a different reason. These people are treated as traitors - this fragments and destroys societal cohesion, and it will get very ugly when they will be asked to leave the monasteries like Pechersk Lavra and the Army will (hopefully not) start shooting at them to take hold of the churches. 

Now I wish the Romanians in southern Ukraine will leave the Ukrainian Church lead by Onufriy and be received into the Romanian Orthodox Church, but I have a heavy suspiction Ukraine will not allow that either.

I am of the opinion Russia and Turkey have A LOT in common: they are both more or less nation-states born out of the shells of their previous empires (Soviet and Tsarist for Russia & Ottoman for Turkey), both suffered territorial contraction and suffer from irrendentism and imperialistic tendecies as a result. Both occupied bits and pieces of their former territories (Turkey occupied Northern Cyprus, territories in Syria and Iraq, supported and is supporting Azerbaijan's expansionist projects in the Caucasus & aids a client regime of sorts in Libya, while Russia occupied Transnistria, South Osethia and Abhazia, Crimea and southern Ukraine and made  Belarus into a puppet state - Russia is actually expanding its influence even further, into Africa where the Wagner Group operates).

The Russian and Ottoman Empires have in fact been arch-enemies long before, competing for the Black Sea and the Balkans. But for these reasons I see them more as enemies which are in a temporary friendly phase.

When WW3 breaks out, Russia and Turkey might very well be on the opposing sides (Russia has always wanted the Bosphorus/ Istanbul for itself, so it can have acces to the Mediteranean, right now Russia is somehow appeasing to Turkey because Turkey plays such a crucial role at the Black Sea and can deny Russia passage, which Russia needs in part to supply its bases in Syria. Also ideologicaly/ sentimentally as the Ottoman Empire was collapsing Russia wanted to takeover Constantinopole, which was the Second Rome - while Moscow was seen as the Third Rome). Here I mention that Russia did a lot of good in the Balkans initially - its pan-Orthodox project which helped the Eastern Christian populations rebel against the Ottomans. Russia did help Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia and even Romania to be set free from the Ottoman fold - Romania-Russia relations were setting off to be great and mutually beneficial. Then Russia annexed Bessarbia and began to Russify it and just like that everything was lost.  This part of history is very frustating to me, because Russia could've achieved what it wanted if instead of direct expansionism it supported a stronger unified Romania which would have been friendly to Russia. Rather it antagonize us over the Bessarabia issue (which goes on to this day).

The Republic of Moldova being a separate state from Romania is in part inconvenient because fot this: Russia still wants it for itself and tries to expand its influence there at every occassion: a united Romania would be harder to influence by Russia and the ethnic Russian population would have less power because they would be a % of the population in an unified state. The Republic sadly doesn't have the prestige, wealth or international fame to make a name for itself - it's not even a real neutral country given Russia occupies part of its territory. Sadly, having illegal Russian troops so close to the capital is absolutely a deal-breaker when it comes to the possibility of making Moldova an international conference type of country, with Ukraine's Odesa region being at war and the Danube being regularily bombed it's even worse.

The Danube Delta area is actually the part of Romania where Romania is building bomb shelters because of war fall out and drone explosion happening on the southern bank of the river. I find it very dangerous and concerning the way the war can affected even a non-party's territory and I hate the optics of this:

 

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

@FfFfFfFF I will reply to you on this Thursday Evening, I just don't manage to do it yet. @LoliLux is in a mess right now. Meanwhile, you can take a look at this paper: https://www.arcadia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/compass-january-2017-russian-ports.pdf to which I will refer on Thursday. It describes how a shift is happening and formerly frozen ports in Russia during winter get usable even in winter, which is imo interesting and contradicting considering Putin cares so much about the warm water ports in the Black Sea.

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

On 11/11/2023 at 9:12 PM, FfFfFfFF said:

When WW3 breaks out, Russia and Turkey might very well be on the opposing sides (Russia has always wanted the Bosphorus/ Istanbul for itself, so it can have acces to the Mediteranean, right now Russia is somehow appeasing to Turkey because Turkey plays such a crucial role at the Black Sea and can deny Russia passage, which Russia needs in part to supply its bases in Syria.

You're more of an expert of the explicitly Orthdox church division of tasks in Ukraine than I am.

Indeed, Turkey can easily block Russia's access to the Mediterranean if there will be a war involving other parties and Turkey arbitrarily interprets the laws of war in which Russia acts contrary to Turkey. But Russia can also block Turkey's access to the Caspian Sea via the Volga-Don Canal and its 17 million square kilometers of airspace. If you add oil and natural gas as leverage, I think that Russia has more leverage over Turkey overall than the other way around. Although the Caspian Sea is not too important and peripheral for Turkey, Turkey wants to be a big player for the Turkic peoples, for the Stan states and they are located on the Caspian Sea. Central Asia often does not dare to criticize Russia because they rely on the Volga-Don Canal. For them it is the connection from the Caspian to the Black Sea and thus to the world, via Russia. Turkey is in a better position than Usbekistan, but is still vulnerable to blackmail from Russia (e.g. tourists). Romania shouldn't be too hostile towards Russia either, as it also has access to other trading partners via the Volga-Don Canal.

But it is in the mutual interest of both countries to have access to the Mediterranean, flight rights and access to resources, which is why Turkey and Russia will probably avoid going to war with each other and I think that is why Turkey will not block the Bosphorus and Russia will not do anything to Turkey, simply because it is more advantageous for both to enjoy each other's amenities.

So Turkey cannot blackmail Russia, but it can blackmail the EU and Turkey loves to do it. Do you still remember the refugee deal between the EU and Türkiye? Turkey shamelessly and brazenly blackmailed the EU and the EU gave in , even though the EU has more leverage over Turkey economically, financially, geo- and demographically. I find it sad that the EU abuses its market power to buy the fishing rights from poor fishermen in Africa, but when it comes to standing firm elsewhere, it fails on Turkey.

And it didn't fail because of the Qualified Majority Voting, because it was Germany and France that gave in and appeased Turkey with billions. Bulgaria alone as an individual nation has defended itself much better against Turkey and its orchestrated migration border crossings than the EU as a whole does with its frontex organization. Actually, the EU, as a group of states, should become more determined, stronger and somehow better in order to assert its interests. But we can see from the example of the refugee package that this is not the case. The EU is failing and dysfunctional, regardless of QMV. If the EU had complete responsibility for border protection in Bulgaria, it would have failed there long ago and Bulgaria's borders would have been breached by Turkey long ago. It is entirely thanks to the Bulgarian and Greek governments that things were not made so easy for Turkey. The EU would have just stood by and watched. So I think bigger is not necessarily better, at least not in Europe.

Russia could also supply the port in Syria with ships from Murmansk/Arkhangelsk region (it sometimes does), the Northern Fleet, it would be longer and more expensive than via the Black Sea and these cost reasons motivate Russia to be nice to Turkey. But Turkey must not forget that Russia will have new, ice-free ports from around 2040. In the paper that I linked to you, a groundbreaking revolution is outlined: it is, at least the researcher assumes, that Vladisvostok and Murmansk will become more important than the Black Sea ports (Novorossiysk, Sochi, Sevastopol) because they will enable year-round transport of goods, as the ice cover in the Arctic region is receding due to global warming. Russia will have an Arctic passage. China will be most interested in this because it will be an alternative to the Malacca Strait, a way to reach Europe without swimming across the Indian Ocean.

As we now see, Putin is very focused on the Black Sea (three of the four oblasts are on the Black Sea or in the adjacent Sea of Azov, and the fourth is basically on the way there). Perhaps it would be better if Putin had instead focused on the future-oriented economic and infrastructural development of Murmansk and Vladivostok, because there is great growth potential there. The Black Sea was very important in the 19th and 20th centuries and before. But it's no longer ultra-important, in my opinion, at least not to fight wars over. Russia's behavior is oriented towards the past. How can we explain that Ukraine is under attack, but Sumy Oblast - the closest oblast to Moscow - is currently under UKR control and has not been occupied for months? A lot of it revolves around the marine oblasts.

Russia is basically getting the world's future second most important sea way (Arctic passage after Malacca Street) for free thanks to global warming, yet it chooses a risky war in Ukraine. Is it a wise behaviour? It doesn't seem so, or?

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

5 hours ago, LoliLux said:

Russia is basically getting the world's future second most important sea way (Arctic passage after Malacca Street) for free thanks to global warming, yet it chooses a risky war in Ukraine. Is it a wise behaviour? It doesn't seem so, or?

I believe the port narrative regarding Russia's decison to invade Ukraine is true, but must be understood in a broader picture: it's not only the pragmatic aspect that Russia needs more ports which do not freeze in the winter at play (which is correct), it's also the fact that Russia became ideologically entrenched in its desire to control the northern half of the Black Sea. This is why control over Crimea is crucial for all parties involved, including NATO - whoever controls Crimea has a lot of power projecting capabilities inside the Black Sea. Besides the maritime importance of Crimea, there are lots of factors that prompted Russia to invade, including, for instance, the increased Western soft power inside Ukraine and the decay of Russian language - Russia knew that sooner or later Ukraine will leave its sphere and unlike the Baltics, Moldova or the Caucasus, Ukraine it's a much deeper red line because of how inter-connected and similar Russia and Ukraine are, both geographically and societally. The invasion was probably in part at attempt to save whatever remained of the Russia-loving Ukraine before it vanishes too- and that turned out to be less than Russia expected, especially outside Donbas and Crimea.

Spoiler

Which brings me to my other point, which is that Russia annexed Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk not because they maritime oblasts - the order is reversed. What I am getting is that the Black Sea region was always more pro-Russian than the rest of Ukraine, because Novorossiya was settled by Ukrainians and Russians together and there are more Russian speakers there compared to the Ukrainian heartland. It's a fact that the great city ports around the Black Sea are Russian cities built by Catherine the Great (the radical pro-Ukrainian supports should concede more often to this point because it's very much true, Russia played the crucial role into expanding Ukraine's borders at the expense of its neighbours, allowed Ukrainian settlement in Crimea and on the northern coast of the Black Sea etc - but the blame for the ethnic cleansing of Circassians and Tatar conveniently falls fully on Russia, even though Ukraine co-participated and reaps the benefits ). Russia did occupy parts of Sumy and Chernihiv, but had to retreat because of Ukrainian resistance- these are very Ukrainian places which put up a fight against Russia. If more Russians and pro-Russians lived in them, Russia might have managed to annexed these oblasts as well - even Kharkiv was close to being annexed and even had its own flag.

What you are saying about the Volga-Don Canal is very interesting: an alternate way around the Caucasus which would allow Turkey to trade with the Turkic states in Central Asia would involved Turkey's ally Azerbaijan, which obviously has a Caspian shore. But for that there would need to corridor passing through Armenia and that's exactly what Azerbaijan and Turkey seek at the moment: the Zangezur Corridor - in a sense, I guess it could be indeed be seen as a way for Turkey to project its influence on Central Asia while bypassing Russian territory (this is something Turkey very much desires: pan-Turkism is a key component of Turkey's foreign policy).

As for Romania, the ship of not antagonizing Russia sailed long ago (pun intended): there is nothing more antagonizing than supplying Ukraine with endless amounts of weapons and money and allowing US to transfer all aid through its territory (Hungary and Slovakia both now deny NATO aid to transit their territory). Romania is in fact a de facto Russian target because of its unconditional support on Ukraine (which is a strategic issue in itself, Ukraine is not treating its ethnic minorities well - whoever denies or obscures this point has an agenda. So this makes for an awkard situation when Romania is continously funding Ukraine's attempts to enlarge its borders while denying the rights of its existing ethnic minorities). This is perplexing and aid should either stop or be made conditional. Like Romania trains Ukrainians to use F16s (and they flew over to Snake Island of all places)

While at the same time, domestically Ukraine will not change 5th grade textbooks in Odesa to mention Romanian instead of Moldovan (the strategy is for Romanian/Moldovan to count as different languages so Romanians in Ukraine will not be an united community). This despite the promise made by Zelensky when he came to Romania. Ukrainian diplomacy is a failure lately for antagonizing all its supposed alloes and now public opinion is going south (and for good reason ).

Despite all help, Ukraine will neither stop dredging the Bystroe canal, neither allow Romanian curriculum schools in Ukraine and neither ditch the idea of ''Moldovenism'' - because all of these could strenghted the Romanian community in Ukraine and this is is seen by Zelensky as a security issue (it's been called as such in past official documents). This is incredibly frustating to many in Romania which feel like we Romania is being used and guilt-tripped into offering unending amounts of support which cannot be put into question because of the mainstream narrative. If I was president I would turn all aid into humaritanian aid (or send DOUBLE the humanitarian aid) and be done with the military stuff until Ukraine's changes its approach when it comes to ethnic minorities.

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

18 hours ago, FfFfFfFF said:

 The invasion was probably in part at attempt to save whatever remained of the Russia-loving Ukraine before it vanishes too- and that turned out to be less than Russia expected, especially outside Donbas and Crimea.

  Reveal hidden contents

Which brings me to my other point, which is that Russia annexed Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk not because they maritime oblasts - the order is reversed. What I am getting is that the Black Sea region was always more pro-Russian than the rest of Ukraine, because Novorossiya was settled by Ukrainians and Russians together and there are more Russian speakers there compared to the Ukrainian heartland. It's a fact that the great city ports around the Black Sea are Russian cities built by Catherine the Great (the radical pro-Ukrainian supports should concede more often to this point because it's very much true, Russia played the crucial role into expanding Ukraine's borders at the expense of its neighbours, allowed Ukrainian settlement in Crimea and on the northern coast of the Black Sea etc - but the blame for the ethnic cleansing of Circassians and Tatar conveniently falls fully on Russia, even though Ukraine co-participated and reaps the benefits ). Russia did occupy parts of Sumy and Chernihiv, but had to retreat because of Ukrainian resistance- these are very Ukrainian places which put up a fight against Russia. If more Russians and pro-Russians lived in them, Russia might have managed to annexed these oblasts as well - even Kharkiv was close to being annexed and even had its own flag.

What you are saying about the Volga-Don Canal is very interesting: an alternate way around the Caucasus which would allow Turkey to trade with the Turkic states in Central Asia would involved Turkey's ally Azerbaijan, which obviously has a Caspian shore. But for that there would need to corridor passing through Armenia and that's exactly what Azerbaijan and Turkey seek at the moment: the Zangezur Corridor - in a sense, I guess it could be indeed be seen as a way for Turkey to project its influence on Central Asia while bypassing Russian territory (this is something Turkey very much desires: pan-Turkism is a key component of Turkey's foreign policy).

 Ukraine will not change 5th grade textbooks in Odesa to mention Romanian instead of Moldovan (the strategy is for Romanian/Moldovan to count as different languages so Romanians in Ukraine will not be an united community).

Here Ukraine behaves like a little Russia and uses the “rule and divide” technique. The remaining UKR will nationalize its entire country after the war. You have to be careful, if you look away, Ukraine will be building a nuclear waste repository on its side of the Danube Delta

I agree with your analysis about the reasons for the invasion. Essentially, this is what Rob Lee, a military strategist, says. He foresaw and calculated Russia's attack and, like you, saw it as a trade-off that would be disadvantageous to Russia in the long run if it did nothing. I think Rob Lee is the best military analyst (after us, of course! ) precisely because it didn't come as a surprise to him, unlike the rest of the world.

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/21/russia-may-think-its-better-to-invade-ukraine-than-to-back-down-fpri.html

On the map you showed on page 1, about the languages and ethnicities in Ukraine, we see up in the edge of Ukraine, there is a majority of Russian speakers in Chernih/Sumy, but only in the north(east), not in the entirety of the oblasts. But it is precisely this north/northeast that is geographically closest to Moscow, “only” 460km. Closer than Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia and all other UKR oblasts to Moscow. Only Belarus is closer, at 400km.

And in Donetz and Luhansk there is a cross-oblast majority of Russians or Russian speakers, while this is not the case for Kherson and Zaporizhia. Actually, there is no reason, no greater reason, why Chernih/Sumy couldn't have been annexed if Kherson and Zaporizhia were  to be annexed - except that these oblasts are seen as just transit areas on the way to Crimea, and then indirectly it doesn't matter who lives there and what is spoken there, since it would definitely have to be annexed - according to Russian logics. However, if one were to expect Russian support in such areas, then the situation would have to be updated by March-May 2022 at the latest. Then Putin would have had to be informed that these areas did not want to become Russian and then this would have had to be corrected or then Chernih/Sumy could have been incorporated (instead) because they are geostrategically (also) important and Kherson and Zaporizhia were not more important (and would not rather become any more Russian than Chernih/Sumy would want to be; so the only bonus of Khers/Sapor is being them a hinterland connection to mainland Russia ).

So the annexed oblasts could actually only have been chosen based on expected historical enthusiasm for Russia or for their warm water ports (or both reasons add up). Since there was no enthusiasm for Russia and there was no update of the oblasts to be annexed, I think that the war is being fought according to an outdated vision, according to an outdated plan. The war is based on an idea of a plan that is actually not realizable. Russia's population is shrinking, no one will want to voluntarily move to a war-torn region (unless they get money), there is a lack of settlers to rebuild and revitalize. And if RU does somehow relocate the settlers, they will be missing in other regions where they are actually desperately needed. Such as in Siberia. Not a good idea to eliminate defects by causing new defects.

All of this brings me to another point, another alternative explanation: Maybe RU's goal is not historically based or military, but is simply about depriving Ukraine of space for economic progress: it's not about having new warm water ports (beyond Crimea) for itself, but about that Ukraine has no warm water ports or fewer. Donbass is being taken away because it is an industrially important region for Ukraine, without which it will be more difficult for it, but for RU Donbass is more of a cost. Mariupol is being taken away so that Ukraine cannot supply the area north of Mariupol more economically. RU's original plan may have been to turn Ukraine into a landlocked country like Moldova, while still having deeper cultural and economic ties.

What the Budjak became for UKR (not necessary but a bonus) and not having the Budjak for MOL (very bad) would essentially become like the Odessa-Kherson-Mariupol Corridor for RU (not necessary but a bonus) and not having this corridor for UKR (very bad). It would follow an old Soviet plan of divide and rule and replicate Soviet logics. I think the difference to your explanation is mainly that RU believed that it would somehow still have influence in this new state, the landlocked UKR (e.g. through corruption) and that it doesn't attribute too much military meaning to it (beyond Crimea, which it already owned before the war). Similar to Moldova. And the UKR would then receive a Trojan horse (perhaps the north of Zaporishja Oblast, parts of Luhansk, after which they were under the media control of RU in the meantime) after perhaps 10 years. In this scenario, RU would tear a piece of UKR for itself, but at the same time want to preserve the majority of UKR as a state and still exert influence there. The difference is that this is not based on a final separation where UKR will forever dislike RU, but rather on a new constellation of dependency through Trojan horses and a UKR in an economically poor situation that would be economically dependent on the ports in the Black Sea in Russian hands. But this plan somehow failed because the West prolonged the war and Russia will not stop first and it reached a point, where UKR now dislike RU too much to become "a big Moldova".

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux All in all, irrespective of the hight concentration of Russians in certain parts of the oblast which you rightly point out, Sumy has a lesser percentage of people who's mother tongue is Russian compared to the Black Sea oblasts (Kherson and Zaporizhia). While Sumy is very close to Kyv and the Ukrainian nationalistic heartland, the south of Ukraine was historically much more integrated with Russia - not a super big number but still significant - 25% of the people in Zaporizhzia oblast declared Russian as their native language in 2001.

Btw, this is a link where you can access super detailed census sort of data regarding all places in Ukraine: http://pop-stat.mashke.org/ukraine-census-2001-lang/total.htm (if you find something incovenient just know ''it's Russian propaganda'', but that's ony if find something INconvenient, otherwise it's a great resource ) My point is, there is a lot of mystification about Ukraine's ethnic makeup in certain segments of the public, I assure you these pp. absolutely never looked up a census record. But I do believe these details are important to be known and shared, the 2001 Ukraine census is the last census Ukraine conducted with this level of detail).

On your description of Russia's goal I agree completely: right now Russia's aims are to turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state that would become a buffer with the Russian Federation (even if UA itself is now wholheartdly and absolutely hostile to Russia). Russia will not allow Ukraine to make any economic progress and will likely try to create as much societal unrest as possible. If living conditions will turn bad, if Zelensky will not step out as a president (under martial law all elections are abolished, and there are no signs Zelensky will allow votes anytime soon), Putin may hope there will be a struggle for power in Ukraine/ some sort of revolution. Which doesn't mean Ukraine will want to switch to Russia, but that Russia will use the chaos that would unhold to its benefit and march its army into civil war-plagued Ukraine. 

Btw, the last time I took a lot of time to respond was when I went to a trip to northern Romania (40kms from the border with Ukraine), now I was in southern Romania (40kms from the border with Serbia)  I also visit the Republic of Moldova, so- to me these places are always close in both ''reading a lot about geopolitics'' way and physically and geographically. I badly want to visit Ukraine (not too far from the border though, but honestly I fear more about the Ukrainian secrete service than any other impediments).

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

On 11/19/2023 at 9:32 PM, FfFfFfFF said:

Btw, the last time I took a lot of time to respond was when I went to a trip to northern Romania (40kms from the border with Ukraine), now I was in southern Romania (40kms from the border with Serbia)   I badly want to visit Ukraine

How was it in Northern Romania, Southern RO and Moldova?  I don't know if you should go to Ukraine, it feels counterintuitive since other people are leaving it

The most important reason why Ukraine will not become a full EU member are the subsidies that many former newer members are chasing after. If Ukraine were a full member, a large number of current EU net recipients would become net payers, meaning they would pay more contributions into the EU coffers than they would receive. Currently, Poland receives the most subsidies and Germany pays the highest contributions. It is an indirect exchange: East Central Europe and Eastern Europe receive money from Germany, in return Germany gets free access to the markets where they then displace the local companies in these countries and can blackmail these countries financially and thus rule over them. Without the subsidies, it would not be attractive for Poland & Co. to be in the EU. Then it would only have disadvantages for the Eastern countries. The richer eastern countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia) would no longer receive subsidies after Ukraine would join,  and Poland would be in a place where it would only receive very little in net terms. Furthermore, Poland's farmers would then have to compete with the superior Ukrainian farmers, who would have free access to their Polish markets and because they offer cheaper prices, that would be the end for Poland's agriculture.

The EU pays subsidies particularly for agricultural land. The more agricultural land a country has in the EU, the more money it can receive. Currently France has the most agricultural land (France only pays half as much net contributions as Germany, despite having 3/4 the population as Germany, it effectively reduces its net contributions through its large  agricultural land). Ukraine would surpass France and become the new number one in agricultural land in the EU and would therefore be entitled to receive by far the most subsidies. The EU countries don't like to admit it publicly, but secretly it's about the costs and the money and Ukraine is considered a high cost factor. Poland will never accept that it will receive little subsidies, the other Eastern countries will become unhappy with EU policies because they will get less than they give (new Brexits in the East?), and have little influence over EU politics because of their small demographics. Effectively, they will just watch France&Germany rule the EU and be reduced to payers.

"Applying current rules to an expanded union, Ukraine would be eligible for €96.5bn from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy over seven years. That financial shift would force cuts in farm subsidies to existing member states of about 20 per cent, according to the study. Ukraine would also qualify for €61bn in payments from the EU’s cohesion funds, which aim to improve infrastructure in poorer member states. With nine additional member states, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta would no longer be eligible for cohesion funding, the study estimates."

https://www.ft.com/content/a8834254-b8f9-4385-b043-04c2a7cd54c8

France doesn't admit it publicly either, but it doesn't want Ukraine either, precisely because it will experience disadvantages in agriculture, similar to Poland, and because Ukraine's demographics will no longer make it so easy for France to rule. Germany has the least problems with this because it would love to take control of the Ukrainian market and already relies on agricultural imports from other countries anyway, which would then become even cheaper, and it loves to pay money to others. Ukraine's accession to the EU would shift the EU's centre of gravity from France-Germany to just Germany. Germany has much more contacts with Ukraine than France and could omit France in EU votings with the help of Ukraine and Poland.

Edit one hour later: @FfFfFfFF I just wanted to add that these concerns and reservations do not apply to Moldova, because Moldova, with a mere 2.6 million inhabitants and an area of 30,000 km² (similar to Belgium), is not perceived as a threat. Its population could certainly be subsidized by the existing EU states without EU net recipients becoming net contributors, simply because Moldova's small population and manageable agricultural land does not have too much weight to tip the situation to the disadvantage of others. Therefore, I think it is important if MOL wants to join the EU that it acts QUICKLY (faster than UKR!) and distances itself from UKR. If MOL+UKR are perceived as a unit by the other states, it has no chance, but individually it is quite possible to become an EU member. (At least Moldova is not important enough for France to organize secret meetings behind closed doors with the Czech Republic with the aim of sabotaging its membership, as in the case of Ukraine.   Preventing membership also costs money and time, and Moldova is fortunate that it is so irrelevant that no one would do it, lucky Moldova)

Edit 80 minutes later @FfFfFfFF: It just occurred to me that since Eastern Europe is losing population, while the population of Western Europe is increasing, Moldova could even be included in the long term WITHOUT increases in contributions for the others if the subsidies are reduced in proportion to the population as the population declines. If I were Moldova's President, I would advertise my membership as “mostly cost-neutral in the long term”.

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux

During my trip in SE Romania I mostly saw the mountains (Apuseni, Retezat, Poaia Rusca etc) and the most breathtaking sceneries were Defileul Jiului, where the road was built in a narrow river passage across the mountains. The nature was simply amazing.  In the northern Carpathians there was snow and it felt like Christmas. Here are two pictures (generic enough to not reveal the locations )

Spoiler

I agree when it comes to the EU, Moldova and the other points. It seems like Maia Sandu think she needs to associate herself with Zelensky so she will increase Republic of Moldova's chances to make it to the EU - that's a mistake. From EU's perspective, Ukraine is a very big commitment, while the Republic of Moldova is small enough teritorially and population-wise (and between 1/3 and 1/2 of its population already has EU citizenship - which means EU population will increase with like 1-2 Million people if MD joins.. as opposed to Ukraine which would bring between 30 and 40 Million people). 

Maia Sandu is amazing and I appreciate her, but she is wrong to tie Moldova's ascension to that of Ukraine, banking on widespread emphathy towards Ukraine, as that will be fading away. The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine actually have many differences and Maia could have been more assertive as it relates to them, for instance when it comes to the Giurgiulești border dispute (where Ukraine occupied a piece of Moldova's internationally recognized territory post-1991 and demanded another territory at Palanca in exchange).

It's not like the Republic of Moldova has any real diplomatic power against Ukraine, but I believe politicians in both Romania proper and the Republic of Moldova would benefit from not sweeping the issues with Ukraine under the rug only so Westernes can idolize Ukraine how they please.

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

22 hours ago, FfFfFfFF said:

@LoliLux

  Reveal hidden contents

Maia Sandu is amazing and I appreciate her, but she is wrong to tie Moldova's ascension to that of Ukraine

 

I believe Santa Claus stops in the Carpathians every year and gets his Christmas tree there

 

How do we know that Sandu hasn't been bought by RU in the meantime and is secretly sabotaging MOL's EU membership herself? Her job would be to form a kind of shadow opposition to Russia and thus win over anti-Russia voters, but actually it would only be about blocking the position of a real pro-EU politician and moving forward with EU accession as slowly as possible. In the end, there would be no accession to the EU at all because Ukraine will likely not become a full member. Maybe RU has learned something new. If you radically prevent opposition or drastically say no to the EU, like Ukraine did before the Maidan, then mass protests can occur and the pro-EU positions suddenly become super strong. RU could have learned and prevented such protests by buying some of the pro-EU politicians and holding out the prospect of joining the EU, but ultimately this will be impossible if it is tied to Ukraine. RU would then not be to blame, but rather the states in the EU who do not agree to this. I'm really looking forward to the lame and pathetic excuses that the EU states will give Ukraine in December 2023, when its accession prospects are finally to be formally sealed (or not). Several countries have reservations, but none want to publicly destroy Ukraine's dreams and hopes.

Lithuania would ideally like Estonia or Latvia to say no to Ukraine. Estonia/Latvia would rather Lithuania say no. France and Austria hope that Hungary will say no. Then FRA and AUS will give a fake YES and act as if they are in favor of it. If I were Viktor Orban, I would just give a YES  and not take the buck/scapegoat, because in the end France will prevent it and then Ukraine can be angry at FRA and not with Hungary. Poland is also in a quandary. They are loyal and helpful to UKR, but money is in the end more important. All EU states are now making up excuses as to why Ukraine is not allowed in.

Perhaps this will happen:  each candidate country will make a small, not impossible, demand on Ukraine. However, all the demands add up and, as a whole, make things very difficult for Ukraine and delay accession. I call this "secret collective shadow blockade". This means that no country would be directly to blame for the failure, but rather the blame would be distributed or Ukraine would be to blame because it could not implement the many individual demands. Back in 1989, the UK publicly supported German reunification. But in reality, in the shadows, the UK did everything it could to prevent East Germany's annexation by West Germany.

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/state-papers-thatcher-opposed-german-reunification-after-collapse-of-berlin-wall-1.4119052

The UK didn't succeed because the US was ultimately for it and the UK's opinion is worthless if the US's opinion differs because the US is the boss and the UK is just decoration. I am excited. Do you think Ukraine will get excuses in December, or a lot of petty demands, or will Hungary be sent as a scapegoat, or will there be a yes?

Sometimes I have the feeling that the EU states are deliberately giving Ukraine a big false hope to join the EU in future on behalf of the USA, so that the Ukrainians are and remain ready to fight, willing to fight and have a motivation to continue the war against RU, it's all about fighting against RU and they don't really care about UKR well-being, imo. But the EU states actually know fully well that they don't want UKR and are giving it false hopes. I find this morally reprehensible. I have pity for the Ukrainians who are given false hopes and believe that morally it's just not okay

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux There are people who are frustated with Maia Sandu because they feel like she isn't lobbying for the unification enough (and that is is secrely a pro-statalist herself), but I disagree - I believe things needs to move at an adequate pace. And she did a lot to bring Bucharest and Chișinău closer together - during her presidency the Republic of Moldova recognized Romanian as the language of the state (replacing the ambigious ''our language'' from before and obviously the Soviet lie of the ''Moldovan language''). Another significant thing happening during her presidency is the fact that Romania took over Bessarabia's gas network - replacing Russia as energy provider.

You are more informed on the geopolitics of the countries west of Poland than I am, but I tend to agree.  Although a side effect of the propaganda machine is that many in Western Europe are personally invested with Ukraine so said governments would need to appease these people in some way (watch Germany, Denmark etc go on this route). I am also confident Romania and Hungary will say no to Ukraine's EU ascension - during the course of our exchange on 2 pages Romania and Ukraine had 3!! diplomatic incidents, the latest revolving around the Ukrainian textbooks designed for the ethnic Romanian children in Ukraine, which turns out are very anti-Romanian. A local leader of a Romanian association uploaded them on the internet a few days ago and the press in Romania picked them up. It's not ''Russian propaganda'' and whatnot, it's Ukraine's own actions that push Romania away from Ukraine and which diminish support.  

All while aid and weapons continue to pour in - it's not an issue of giving a ''thank you'' by this point, it's just basic courtesy of not trashing your so-called ally & we are not even being granted this. 

https://infoprut.ro/113008-narativele-romanofobe-ale-propagandei-sovietice-la-loc-de-cinste-in-manualele-de-istorie-a-ucrainei-pentru-etnicii-romani.html 

I don't think Hungary cares if it's being perceived as adversarial by Ukraine by this point, I believe Hungary will absolutely say no to all talks regarding Ukraine' EU ascension. Although maybe they'll say yes only so latenly Ukraine skeptic countries in Western Europe would need to reveal themselves, which in turn would feel like a betrayal to Ukraine. This is a level of pettiness I imagine Orban within his soul. 

[Ayesha Erotica 1,924]

On 11/7/2023 at 10:32 AM, FfFfFfFF said:

Russia has been extremely hostile to Romania (and still is), so by aligning itself with the US, Romania gained a deterrent.

I think Romania needs a second deterrent other than NATO. Simply to reduce dependence and being at the mercy of the USA. What could be the second deterrent? A main trade route link to China. When RU invaded UKR, how did China behave? Interestingly, some time after the outbreak of war, China expressed its full support of territorial integrity to one country... but that country was not Ukraine, it was Kazakhstan.

https://eurasianet.org/china-warns-against-meddling-in-kazakhstan-ahead-of-putin-meeting

Presumably because UKR has no strong ties with CH, while KAZ is important for CH. It is also interesting to note that RU never attacked KAZ, even though ethnic Russians live in the north (and a majority were there before KAZ decided to resettle Kazakhs). Perhaps China did not want KAZ to be attacked. Currently, China has two main land connections (apart from sea routes) to Central Europe:

1. via Mongolia via Russia via Belarus via Poland to Duisburg.

2. via Central Asia, via Iran via Turkey via Greece via Serbia to Duisburg.

So far the paths have been designed in such a way that they practically bypass Romania, north and south. I think Romania should become a third main connection by shifting the Port of Constanța's trade more towards China. It is possible to bring things from the Port of Constanta to China via Russia, via Georgia, also from Turkey, and via Iran through the Volga-Don Canal. The Port of Constanța-China connection would be Romania's window into the Eastern world. The big and unbeatable advantage for Romania would be that if Turkey ever closed the Bosphorus, it would still be connected to the largest trading nation in the world, since China has created an overland route to Europe via Russia/Georgia, Turkey is in theory circumventable. This would prevent Turkey from blackmailing Romania if situations worsen in the future. I think that a connection from the Port of Constanța and an intensification of trade with China through it would become the second biggest deterrent for RO, because RU would not be allowed to attack RO if RO was a main market goods hub for China. Therefore, the country's security lies in well-developed trade relations with China. China is also looking for alternative trade routes to Europe. China didn't like how it was once criticized by Turkey. China knows that Turkey is unpredictable. China would like to use the Port of Constanta as an alternative. But Romania's politicians have so far neglected China, perhaps because the US pressure RO into not having good relations with China. There is great potential in the Port of Constanta-China connection.

[FfFfFfFF 58,113]

@LoliLux Yes, it's an open secret China is the reason why Russia never tried anything with Kazahstan and I do agree Romania should work more closely with China, only to see the US panic and give us more concessions.  Unfortunately it's not like Romanian politicians have 1) the courage or 2) the vision needed to enhance Romania's presence on the world stage, and Bucharest believes it needs to act like an American proxy otherwise America will leave us to be swallowed up by Russia (as if it's not US' direct goal to maintain its bases here). As such, no politician will do something perceived as going against the US, because his career will be over. On anther level this is the psychological effect of Romania's abandonment in the wake of WW2, when Russia took Bessarabia & northern Bukowina, Hungary annexed northern Transylvania and Bulgaria took Cadrilater, and nobody stepped in to help.

I don't understand why the US doesn't tell Ukraine that it needs to respect the rights of its ethnic minorities and that should stop dredging the Danube - the US would gain so much popularity in Romania and Hungary doing the bare minimum, but frankly Ukraine is more important than Romania and Hungary- so that's not happening. After the grain fiasco, Biden literally blackmailed Poland into reverting back to its previous levels of support, saying they will no longer get American F16s - this is where we're at!

For these reasons, I love it when countries like France and Turkey play both sides, because they know they are strategically important enough to create some panic in Washington and coerce all parties to be more welcoming to their needs and desires. I agree with Macron that the EU should follow its own path when it comes to Taiwan - not everything that concerns the US should concern us (reversely not everything that concerns Romania concerns the US- see above ).