4 potential responses to a nuclear attack in Ukraine from the West

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Video mostly based to an article by atomic scientist Jeffrey Edmonds, talking about 4 hypotethical reactions to Russia detonating a nuke in Ukraine. They include:

- respond in kind

Spoiler

 

In any escalatory move, the first impulse may be to respond in kind. If your adversary moves along the escalation spectrum a notch, then perhaps you should as well, lest you lose the fight for escalation dominance.

The United States and NATO could respond in kind to a Russian use of a non-strategic nuclear weapon or weapons, perhaps via dual-capable aircraft, i.e. those that can carry conventional and nuclear weapons. In such a response, perhaps the most difficult problem involves choosing the target. That choice, of course, will be partly contingent on just what Russia has done.

In the scenario we are exploring, Russia has used a non-strategic nuclear weapon in Ukraine. To truly be “in-kind” in this scenario, the US and NATO would need to strike Russian targets in Ukraine—or otherwise significantly change the nature of the conflict by striking a target in Russia. There may be Russian military targets in Ukraine for which a low-yield nuclear strike would produce limited casualties. But to have a significant military impact, NATO would likely have to use multiple strikes. However,the potential for lasting impacts and the optic of two nuclear powers carrying out nuclear exchanges on the territory of a non-nuclear state would be politically infeasible. So, it’s probably safe to exclude a Western response in kind, in Ukraine, using tactical nuclear weapons.

Striking a target in Russia with a nuclear weapon, regardless of yield, fundamentally changes the conflict. In this scenario, Russia has not used a nuclear weapon against the United States, NATO, or any country with which the United States has extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. Using a nuclear weapon against Russia immediately turns the conflict into a Russia versus the United States and NATO war that has skipped all the conventional options for escalation management. Given the potential global consequences of a nuclear war between Russia and the United States and NATO, striking targets inside Russia with nuclear weapons is unlikely to be viewed by the US president as a viable option. So the option of a Western response in kind to a Russian use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine can probably be set aside, given the targeting and extreme escalation ramifications of a Western use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or in Russia.

And there is an additional, not insignificant reason to avoid a response in kind: Reinforcement of the norm against using nuclear weapons. By refusing to use nuclear weapons in response to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine, the United States and its NATO allies would draw a stark contrast between those who are and are not willing to use nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear states.

 

- conventional strikes against Russia

Spoiler

 

These could go after Russian units themselves, logistic hubs, or any number of platforms Russia is using to persecute the war. If the Russian use of nuclear weapons targeted Ukraine’s ability to fight, one targeting criteria to consider would be those targets that negate any Russian advantage gained by its use of nuclear weapons. A second option would be to target the platform used by Russia to carry out the strike—a platform that would almost certainly be based inside Russia itself.

It is fair to say that either of these options leads to an expansion of the conflict to one between Russia and the United States and its NATO allies. The fundamental change here is the deliberate targeting of the Russian military by US and NATO platforms. While Ukraine is using US and NATO weapons to kill Russian troops, there is an escalation salient between this and NATO and US forces directly attacking the Russian military. The argument can certainly be made that crossing the conventional-nuclear threshold by Russia against Ukraine warrants the entry of NATO and the United States into the conflict. This would reinforce the view that the use of nuclear weapons in such scenarios, and especially for coercive reasons, is unacceptable. Of course, this would lead to a Russian response against NATO. Despite most of its ground forces being caught in the war in Ukraine, Russia could attempt to strike US and NATO infrastructure both in Europe and the United States, the latter being through land-strike missions from submarines in the Atlantic.

A conventional response against Russian use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine carries with it clear escalatory risks, although lower than those associated with a symmetrical response. However, the impetus for some response would be intense and arguably justified. A conventional response is a viable policy option that seeks to maintain some control over escalation while acknowledging the need to respond.

 

- staying the course

Spoiler

In a third type of response, the United States and NATO could stay the course and continue to provide military aid to the Ukrainians without escalating the war with attacks against Russia or Russian military forces. The core of this response is the realization that the current trajectory in the Russia-Ukraine conflict favors Ukraine and that Russia’s use of nuclear weapons is an act of desperation. Russia is losing and the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, whether to stop Ukraine’s military or to coerce Ukraine and the West, seems to be the next only available option for Putin. This policy option attempts to keep the conflict as much confined to Ukraine-Russia as possible while also weakening Russia by continuing to support and enable Ukrainian successes.

- push for settlement

Spoiler

 

Push for settlement. Given the consequences of a nuclear war between the United States, NATO, and Russia and the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine should the conflict continue, this option argues for ending the conflict in some way that gives the Russian leadership an “out” from the conflict. While seemingly reasonable given the level of destruction and costs of escalation, this option has significant challenges and implications for the international security environment.

The central challenge to this option is the lack of overlapping interests and positions in a negotiated settlement between the Russians and Ukrainians. From the Russian perspective, a negotiated settlement would entail ceasing security cooperation between Ukraine and the United States and NATO, neutrality of Ukraine, and the acceptance of Russian possession of Crimea and the Donbass, along with a host of other security assurances favorable to the Russian government. Given the Ukrainian success in defending their country thus far, this does not seem politically feasible or desirable from the perspective of the Ukrainian leadership.

For the United States and NATO to push the Ukrainian government to negotiate for a position that Ukraine believes is contrary to its core interests, the United States and NATO would need to force the Ukrainian government to the negotiating table by threatening to abandon support for Ukraine. This does not seem politically feasible given the current support and solidarity in the West. But more important, it would signal that nuclear blackmail is effective. Coercion by the United States and NATO against Ukraine to force a negotiated settlement would be tantamount to a 180-degree shift in policy because of Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This would set an extremely dangerous precedent going forward, not only for Russia but for other world actors, especially in the Asian-Pacific, that could see a low cost of using nuclear weapons as an argument for them playing a greater role in pursuing their own geopolitical goals.

If Putin decides to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it will represent an unparalleled level of barbarity and an eschewing of international norms. It will also present NATO and the United States with complicated policy options, all of which have potential global consequences. I have attempted to lay out a broad framework for potential policy responses. I argue that the two extremes, responding in kind and pushing for a settlement, are unwise given the escalatory risks or potential for establishing destructive and unstable patterns of behavior. The two other options—escalating conventionally against Russia or staying the course—each have their own risks and levels of uncertainty. Except for bending to nuclear coercion, it is difficult to see how Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine does not significantly raise the possibility of a conflict between Russia and NATO.

 

We are living in very tense times nowadays so it's understandable than when people hear about nukes, they immediately panic. One may think Russia and America will exchange nukes and anihilate each other in no time, but this misses a lot of steps and is super exaggerated given our circumstances. The response from the West might not be nuclear - but conventional. Similarily, it might not involve nuking Russia, but Russian targets in Ukraine. The article says the extreme of doing nothing and the extreme of responding with a nuke are dangerous, but IF the event of a nuke eventually does come, the West should make sure to find the appropriate response that neither justifies the use of nukes in wars by letting Russia get away with it, neither moves to anihilate Russia as that would certainly trigger a nuclear exchange.

[Guest]

Im so numb to this i feel nothing anymore, honestly whatever happens ill try to be ready and i hope this **** can have an ending at some point

[Economy 53,112]

My biggest worry if is Putin reaches near end of his life and doesn't care anymore and decides f*CK it I'm going down with a bang I don't care how they retaliate

 

Cuz I wouldn't put that past him

[Guest]

15 minutes ago, Economy said:

My biggest worry if is Putin reaches near end of his life and doesn't care anymore and decides f*CK it I'm going down with a bang I don't care how they retaliate

 

Cuz I wouldn't put that past him

He cant do it without all his team agreeing to it 

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Youtube video by political scientist and assistent professor at the University of Pitsburg

 

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Just now, AnnaNicoleSmith said:

He cant do it without all his team agreeing to it 

True!

The possibility is for him to delegate his decision capabilities to some generals on the frontlines, putting the decision in their hands (but is also unlikely). But as of now there is a team of people that would need to give their okay before Russia launches a nuke.

Side note is that if Russia breaks up, the battle for ownership of the nukes between the new states will be intense.

[Guest]

1 minute ago, FfFfFfFF said:

True!

The possibility is for him to delegate his decision capabilities to some generals on the frontlines, putting the decision in their hands (but is also unlikely). But as of now there is a team of people that would need to give their okay before Russia launches a nuke.

Side note is that if Russia breaks up, the battle for ownership of the nukes between the new states will be intense.

What do u mean if Russia breaks up?

[Economy 53,112]

21 minutes ago, AnnaNicoleSmith said:

He cant do it without all his team agreeing to it 

True true true

 

But let's not underestimate his manipulative power

 

I also never said it was likely. Just not outside the realm of possibility for me. Enough to be of a concern to me let's put it that way

[Guest]

Just now, Economy said:

True true true

 

But let's not underestimate his manipulative power

 

I also never said it was likely. Just not outside the realm of possibility for me. Enough to be of a concern to me let's put it that way

Well apparently a lot in his team are tired of him, i think they would poison him tbh

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37 minutes ago, AnnaNicoleSmith said:

What do u mean if Russia breaks up?

I mean if the various republics and oblasts inside Russia declare independence. Like Checknya, Yakutia etc.

[Economy 53,112]

39 minutes ago, AnnaNicoleSmith said:

Well apparently a lot in his team are tired of him, i think they would poison him tbh

From what source? I haven't kept up lately

[Togekiss 3,179]

Pretty interesting and honestly reassuring that even if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine it’s unlikely that there will be a nuclear response.

I really wonder though, given what we’ve learned about the state of Russia’s military and equipment… has our assessment of their nuclear capabilities changed? What’s to say the officials in charge of maintaining those capabilities decided the nukes would never be used anyway so why not just take that money and line their own pockets? That ish happens all the time in the Russian military, hence the million “missing” uniforms discovered when the conscriptions started. Someone took the money for themselves and put a fake order on the books.

[Neroneau 1,017]

A conventional response still means war in the rest of Europe.

The US is far away and safe as it is, the Atlantic is your moat. 

So many Americans don’t give a ****, using our continent as a shield. 

We’re already at war with Russia, a hybrid one. If the war becomes conventional and touches and starts killing and destroying the rest of Europeans only America can benefit from Europe become a battlefield for NATO. Russia still must dog down with a war on their border or even inside its borders and even the far possibility of the dismemberment of the federal Russian state. 
I’m afraid if something happens here me and my sis won’t be able flee back to our countries in the south pacific 

[Neroneau 1,017]

41 minutes ago, Togekiss said:

Pretty interesting and honestly reassuring that even if Russia uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine it’s unlikely that there will be a nuclear response.

I really wonder though, given what we’ve learned about the state of Russia’s military and equipment… has our assessment of their nuclear capabilities changed? What’s to say the officials in charge of maintaining those capabilities decided the nukes would never be used anyway so why not just take that money and line their own pockets? That ish happens all the time in the Russian military, hence the million “missing” uniforms discovered when the conscriptions started. Someone took the money for themselves and put a fake order on the books.

I’m sorry but a conventional response opposed to a nuclear one by NATO is still means war in the rest of the continent :c

[Togekiss 3,179]

10 minutes ago, Neroneau said:

I’m sorry but a conventional response opposed to a nuclear one by NATO is still means war in the rest of the continent :c

Still much better that MAD!